| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB last_entry pointer from unbounded LastNameOffset
CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() locate the last entry of a
TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response by adding the
LastNameOffset of the response parameters to the start of the data
area, and store the result in psrch_inf->last_entry. MS-CIFS 2.2.6.2.2
defines that offset as the offset of the entry's file name; the client
follows the reading of NT and Samba servers, which point it at the
entry. LastNameOffset is only checked against CIFSMaxBufSize, which
says nothing about the response actually received: validate_t2() lets
the data area start up to 1024 bytes into the buffer, and SendReceive()
copies at most CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE bytes of a response,
16468 by default, into a cifs_request allocation of CIFSMaxBufSize +
MAX_SMB2_HDR_SIZE bytes, 16588 by default. The pointer itself can
therefore be placed anywhere from the end of the received data to 820
bytes past the end of the allocation.
The read through that pointer is far larger than its displacement.
find_cifs_entry() hands last_entry to cifs_save_resume_key() after every
FindNext and after the FindFirst of a search rewind, and
cifs_fill_dirent() takes the length of the name from the entry itself: a
__le32 FileNameLength for most levels, a __u8 for
SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD, and for SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX the result of a
scan for the terminating NUL over up to PATH_MAX + 1 UTF-16 units. The
name is recorded as the resume name of the search, and the next
CIFSFindNext() rejects only a recorded length of PATH_MAX or more before
copying the name into the ResumeFileName of its request and sending it
with the resume key taken from the same entry: up to 4 KiB of memory
from past the end of the allocation leaks to the server, and for
SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX the NUL scan runs about twice as far before the
length is even known. The entry does not have to lie outside the
response for that either: a maximal response ends about 120 bytes before
the end of the allocation, so an entry in its last bytes with a name
just under PATH_MAX has nearly all of that name copied from past the
allocation.
It needs nothing unusual from the client: a FindNext response that
reports no entries and does not end the search makes find_cifs_entry()
send the next FindNext at once, carrying whatever was parsed at
LastNameOffset, and a search rewind can do the same after its
FindFirst. SMB1 is not negotiated by default: this takes a malicious
or compromised server, a mount of it with an explicit vers=1.0, which
CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY (default y) permits, and a directory
listing on that mount.
With KASAN enabled, a response that places the last entry past the
buffer, with a large DataOffset and a LastNameOffset near the end of
its range, gives:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cifs_save_resume_key.isra.0+0x7aa/0x7f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b55c33b by task ls/83
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: ls Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-00457-gf14572c203d5 #69 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0
cifs_save_resume_key.isra.0+0x7aa/0x7f0
cifs_readdir+0x1ed6/0x29c0
iterate_dir+0x1c0/0x570
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x133/0x270
do_syscall_64+0x109/0x5d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 83 on cpu 0 at 19.317556s:
cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x90
smb_init+0x4f/0x110
CIFSFindNext+0xf7/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807b558000
which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588
The buggy address is located 623 bytes to the right of
allocated 16588-byte region [ffff88807b558000, ffff88807b55c0cc)
==================================================================
The four bytes read there are the FileNameLength of the entry, which
cifs_fill_dirent() tak
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: snapshot dentry names in file and setattr traces
Patch series "ocfs2: stabilize dentry names in file and setattr traces",
v4.
Snapshot names at all six users of ocfs2__file_ops and at the separate
setattr event. Patch 1 handles the five ordinary file-operation callers
and setattr. Patch 2 handles release separately to preserve its locked
open-count sample and take the snapshot outside that critical section.
The release explanation distinguishes its existing RCU lifetime coverage
from name/length consistency. It does not claim that the ordinary
callers' external-name UAF interleaving crosses the held inode spinlock.
The release source change is unchanged from v3.
Patch 1 also removes the read callback's redundant NULL-inode check.
The two patches apply independently and leave trace formats unchanged.
This patch (of 2):
The open, fsync, read, write and splice-read trace calls pass the live
dentry name and length to the shared ocfs2__file_ops event class.
ocfs2_setattr() passes the same unprotected arguments to its own event.
Both events size and copy a __string field separately. A reference to
the dentry does not pin the external storage backing an individual name.
With an event enabled, a caller can be preempted after loading the name
pointer. A long-to-short rename can then replace the name and reclaim its
old external allocation before the trace callback sizes or copies it,
provided no other snapshot retains that allocation.
The setattr inode lock does not exclude every rename: a same-directory
rename of a source directory need not take that directory's inode lock.
It can therefore change the dentry name while setattr records its event.
Inline names and separately loaded lengths can also change during trace
record sizing and copying.
Take a dentry name snapshot around each of these six trace calls and
pass both the string and length from the snapshot. Check event enablement
before taking a snapshot. Keep the event classes and formats unchanged.
Also remove the redundant NULL-inode check in the read callback.
file_inode() returns the open file's inode, which is already used by the
trace call above the check.
The historical report below is from the read path.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strlen+0x85/0xa0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a5b2b18 by task python3/496
[CPU and host details omitted.]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? strlen+0x85/0xa0
strlen+0x85/0xa0
trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0xf0/0x480
? __pfx_trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0xe7/0x1c0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0x10/0x10
ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x6cd/0xb30
? __pfx_ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x10/0x10
? selinux_file_permission+0x11d/0x540
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80
vfs_read+0x7d2/0xc20
? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
ksys_read+0x111/0x200
? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x11d/0x150
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[User register dump omitted.]
</TASK>
Allocated by task 489:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2de/0x780
__d_alloc+0x5fc/0x8c0
d_alloc_parallel+0x106/0x11d0
lookup_open+0x3ff/0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: cancel quota sync work before freeing quota info
OCFS2 quota info owns dqi_sync_work and must outlive both its timer and
qsync_work_fn(). ocfs2_local_free_info() frees that owner without
cancelling the work, relying on the quota suspend/disable wrappers.
Loading quotas on a read-only to read-write remount can successfully queue
the work in ocfs2_global_read_info() and then fail while attaching a dquot
to an existing inode in add_dquot_ref(). The quota core unwinds that
failure directly through dquot_disable(), bypassing the OCFS2 wrapper:
Remount task (s_umount write) Timer/workqueue
ocfs2_global_read_info()
schedules dqi_sync_work
add_dquot_ref() returns an error
dquot_disable()
ocfs2_local_free_info()
frees oinfo
delayed-work timer expires
qsync_work_fn() reads oinfo
The timer core can then write to the freed embedded timer, or
qsync_work_fn() can read oinfo->dqi_gqinode before its s_umount trylock.
The outer ocfs2_disable_quotas() cleanup skips the failed type because
dquot_disable() has already cleared its loaded state.
Cancel dqi_sync_work synchronously at the start of
ocfs2_local_free_info(), before dropping the global inode or freeing any
owner state. The work is initialized whenever read_file_info() succeeds.
dquot_disable() holds s_umount for write, so the callback skips its quota
scan via down_read_trylock() and can finish without waiting for teardown.
The synchronous cancel also handles its self-rearm.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888111b0aad0 by task swapper/3/0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
__run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
? __pfx___run_timers+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0x5a3/0x2140
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
timer_expire_remote+0xfa/0x160
? __pfx_timer_expire_remote+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x4ba/0x9d0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
? tmigr_handle_remote+0x21a/0x340
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
__walk_groups_from+0x5a/0x160
tmigr_handle_remote+0x24f/0x340
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
run_timer_softirq+0x222/0x270
? __pfx_run_timer_softirq+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xb8/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
handle_softirqs+0x1fa/0x8d0
? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x1fb/0x5d0
__irq_exit_rcu+0x113/0x1e0
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xc5/0xf0
? do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
default_idle+0x9/0x10
default_idle_call+0x6c/0xb0
do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
? cpuhp_online_idle+0x9c/0xb0
? __pfx_do_idle+0x10/0x10
? __entry_text_end+0x1020f6/0x1020f9
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xeb/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
? srso_a
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/heartbeat: unlink live slots when their node is missing
o2hb_shutdown_slot() returns immediately when its node is no longer in the
configfs registry. A slot can still be linked in o2hb_live_slots when
that lookup fails. Region teardown or startup-error cleanup then frees
the slot array without removing its embedded list member.
With the same peer live in another region, the next list update can follow
a predecessor into the freed array. Reusing the node number can also make
a later insertion encounter that stale member.
Always remove the slot under o2hb_live_lock, even when node lookup fails.
Preserve aggregate membership accounting and the last-region DOWN
callback: the existing callback interface explicitly permits a NULL node
for DOWN events. Only drop the node reference when lookup returned one.
This closes both normal release and startup-abort paths without changing
the publication or callback locking protocol.
Also require a configured node before admitting a new live slot in
o2hb_check_slot(). The early live-bitmap check is not held through
admission: the last live slot in another region can be removed in between.
Without a node, admission can then queue an UP event with a NULL argument
and hit the event helper's BUG_ON. Existing live slots can still leave
and generate NULL-node DOWN events.
A controlled probe-instrumented test reproduced this while stopping one of
two regions after removing the peer from configfs. Its KASAN report
includes:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x1e0/0x210
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a4ac60 by task o2hb-pmbd0058_b/497
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x1e0/0x210
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x1591/0x2c50
o2hb_thread+0x1ed/0xe70
kthread+0x351/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 491:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2de/0x780
o2hb_region_dev_store+0x7c2/0x1b60
configfs_write_iter+0x2f9/0x4f0
vfs_write+0x639/0x1010
ksys_write+0x111/0x200
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 491:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x308/0x580
o2hb_unmap_slot_data+0x1db/0x330
o2hb_region_release+0x14b/0x4f0
config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230
config_item_put+0x79/0x90
configfs_rmdir+0x58a/0x910
vfs_rmdir+0x2e8/0x820
filename_rmdir+0x3b1/0x520
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x4b/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: Fix use after free in bpf progs
Since commit dccc0c3ddf8f ("media: rc: fix race between unregister and
urb/irq callbacks"), rcdev->raw is no longer set to NULL after device
unregister. raw->progs could point to stale data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: After rc_unregister_device() timers can be re-armed
If rc_keydown() is called after rc_register_device(), then the timers
can be re-armed. Delete them again for a final time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: Use after free in ir_raw_event_handle()
If rc_unregister_device() is called while IR is being processed, then
ir_raw_event_handle() could call wake_up_process(dev->raw->thread)
after kthread_stop(dev->raw->thread). Avoid use after free by using
get_task_struct(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: mce_kbd: Fix inconsistent locking of keylock
data->keylock is taken with spin_lock() in ir_mce_kbd_decode(), which
runs in the raw IR decode kthread with local interrupts enabled, but
with spin_lock_irqsave() in mce_kbd_rx_timeout(), the rx_timeout timer
callback, which runs in softirq context.
If the decode kthread is holding keylock via spin_lock() when a timer
interrupt fires on the same CPU and the softirq runs
mce_kbd_rx_timeout(), the softirq spins forever waiting for a lock
that only the now-preempted kthread can release, while the kthread
cannot run again until the softirq gives up the CPU. This deadlocks
the CPU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: Ensure registered is cleared in error path
If rc_register_device() fails, ensure that registered is not set to true.
If lirc_register() succeeded, then userspace could have an open file
descriptor open. This leads to a use-after-free.
lirc_unregister() must be called with registered = false, else there is a
possibility that an fd is open and polling, which would never return
POLLERR unless registered is false.
Note that registered must be changed under dev->lock, many functions
read registered under lock (e.g. lirc_ioctl). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: Ensure that rc_unregister_device() does not free input device
During or after rc_unregister_device(), IR may still be reported which
results in a input event being reported. This could result in a null
pointer deref in rc_keydown() or a use-after-free of the input device if
the pointer was read before it is set to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: core: Fix OOB read for bit offsets of more than one byte
When the bit offset is BITS_PER_BYTE or larger the read position is
advanced by `bytes_offset`. This is not taken into account in the
per-byte read loop which still reads `cell->bytes` resulting in an out of
bounds read of `bytes_offset` bytes. The information read OOB does not
leak directly as the erroneously read bits are cleared.
Detected by KASAN while looking for a use-after-free in simplefb.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pps: generators: don't use the driver's info after unregister
A file that was opened before pps_gen_unregister_source() keeps
pps_gen, and with it the pointer to the driver's pps_gen_source_info.
PPS_GEN_SETENABLE and PPS_GEN_USESYSTEMCLOCK keep using that pointer
after the driver has gone:
- pps_gen_tio allocates its info with devm_kzalloc(), so after an
unbind both ioctls read freed memory, and SETENABLE calls the
driver's enable() with its freed private data.
- pps_gen-dummy does not set info->owner, so it can be unloaded while
the file is open, and the ioctls then read the unloaded module's
data and call its code.
TIO can't probe in a VM, as it needs ART. A test driver that registers
its info in devm memory like TIO does, unbound while /dev/pps-gen0 is
open, gives:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x4c1/0x580
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e647f38 by task ppsgen64/145
...
Freed by task 146:
kfree+0x25a/0x6d0
release_nodes+0xd1/0x140
devres_release_all+0x10e/0x1a0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x71/0x250
device_release_driver_internal+0x41b/0x570
unbind_store+0xd9/0x100
and unloading pps_gen-dummy while its file is open oopses:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0203040
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pps_gen_cdev_ioctl+0x372/0x580
Protect info in the ioctl handler with a mutex, and clear it under the
mutex on unregister, so that unregister waits for the ioctls using it
and later ones fail with -ENODEV. PPS_KC_BIND does the same for a
removed PPS device since commit 3649f9a6b897 ("pps: don't allow
PPS_KC_BIND on removed devices"). The sysfs attributes need nothing
new: they are removed, and their callbacks drained, before info is
cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: sbs-battery: disable polling before supply teardown
The managed poll-work cancellation is registered before the power
supply, so cleanup unregisters the supply before draining polling.
A pending or running poller can then call power_supply_changed() on
the released supply.
Commit 8d59cf3887fb ("power: supply: sbs-battery: Fix use-after-free in
power_supply_changed()") moved the IRQ request after supply registration,
but did not change the poll-work cancellation order.
Add a later managed action that disables and drains polling before
supply teardown. Its retained disabled state prevents external-power
callbacks from rearming the poll work after it has been drained.
Keep the original autocancel to initialize work before supply callbacks
can run and to cover failed supply registration.
The teardown ordering issue was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: pf1550: drain IRQ work before unregistering supplies
The VBUS work calls power_supply_changed(), but its managed
cancellation is registered before the supplies. Cleanup can therefore
unregister a supply while IRQ-triggered work is still pending.
Commit 838767f50747 ("power: supply: pf1550: Fix use-after-free in
power_supply_changed()") moved IRQ requests after supply registration,
but left work cancellation before the supplies. That change protects
the direct IRQ callbacks, while this fix drains the work they queue.
Register the three work items after both supplies and before the IRQs.
Cleanup then frees the IRQ producers, drains the work, and unregisters
the supplies.
The teardown ordering issue was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: core: Fix race-condition between _of_phy_get() and try_module_get()
Sashiko asked during a patch review if the existing usage pattern had a
race condition; specifically in of_phy_get() if it was possible between
returning from _of_phy_get() and running try_module_get() that a module
might be unbound leading to use-after-free.
Looking at the code this appears to be so, there is no linkage between the
phy and module under a synchronisation primitive.
Using the phy_provider_mutex in phy_get() will ensure there is a link between
the returned phy pointer and the module_get() bumping the module reference
count.
Amend phy_get(), of_phy_get() and devm_of_phy_get_by_index() to fix the
same usage pattern.
phy_provider_unregister() must take the phy_provider_mutex so amending
phy_get()/of_phy_get() to take that same mutex guarantees there is no
use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout
If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA
abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns
through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the
done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state
(p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered.
The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from
p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and
p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse
once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late
done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the
failed one.
Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status
and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and
the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that
subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on
once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that
failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep
running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is
exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is
left disabled, as the abort paths already do.
The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two
SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort
status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also
suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts.
Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in
progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on
the cleared state.
No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model
of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace
replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and
interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine
that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the
freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an
engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also
loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this
fix applied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: fix refcount underflow in gadgetfs_bind() error path
gadgetfs_bind() calls get_dev() only on the success path, but
gadgetfs_unbind() called from the enomem error label unconditionally
calls put_dev(). When bind fails (e.g. ENOMEM), put_dev() fires
without a matching get_dev(), leaving the refcount unbalanced.
A subsequent close of the ep0 file descriptor calls dev_release() ->
put_dev() which hits zero and frees the object; then gadgetfs_kill_sb()
calls put_dev(the_device) again on the already-freed pointer, triggering
a refcount underflow and use-after-free.
Fix by calling get_dev() at the start of gadgetfs_bind(), before any
error path that invokes gadgetfs_unbind(), so the reference is always
balanced regardless of whether bind succeeds or fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode
When the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the
device is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops. That table opens
through nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through
vfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.
nvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev->usemem for poison handling
unconditionally. In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and
register_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX].
Nothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device
is unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it. The next open
after a rebind reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
print_report+0x153/0x4c6
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0
interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100
nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730
vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520
vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0
vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 188:
...
_vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500
nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660
local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170
...
Freed by task 188:
...
kfree+0x20d/0x600
device_release+0xcf/0x250
kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0
pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0
device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540
unbind_store+0xde/0x100
...
Give the fallback table its own open_device that only calls
vfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the
counterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device(). Fallback mode then never
touches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.
This should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core
read, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state
nvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up. The one visible difference is that a
fallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches
vfio-pci. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: delete channel-context timers on deinit
ath9k_deinit_channel_context() cancels chanctx_work but does not delete
the offchannel and sched timers set up by ath9k_init_channel_context().
If either timer fires after deinit (e.g. during driver unload or
suspend), it accesses sc->sc_ah which may already be freed by
ath9k_hw_deinit(), causing a use-after-free.
Delete both timers with timer_shutdown_sync() before cancelling the work
item. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests
In blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring's persistent grants,
shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring),
and only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end.
While blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the
shadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still
registered and active. If an interrupt arrives from the backend during
this teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo->ring.sring and,
via blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and
rinfo->shadow[id].sg. blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down
without holding rinfo->ring_lock, and the handler only checks
info->connected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a
use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of
blkif_free_ring(). Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the
IRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs
before ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated,
matching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c. |