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Search Results (90 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-77831 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Paper Trail | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in ash-project ash_paper_trail allows a user who can submit a large array attribute to a paper-trailed create or update action to cause a denial of service through excessive CPU and memory use. With full-diff change tracking, AshPaperTrail.ChangeBuilders.FullDiff.ListChange pairs each prior array element against the new list by rebuilding the remaining-elements accumulator with acc ++ [tuple] on every step, copying the growing list each time, so the pairing scales cubically in the array length. Nothing bounds the length and the value comes straight from action input, so one request carrying a large accepted {:array, _} attribute forces tens of seconds of CPU and multi-gigabyte allocations. This issue affects ash_paper_trail: from 0.1.1 before 0.7.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77454 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Sql | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller to bypass a scoping or authorization filter expressed as exists/2 over a relationship that declares both a limit (or from_many?) and a parent(...)-referencing filter or sort. AshSql.Join.related_query/3 skips the caller-supplied exists predicate for such relationships and delegates it to limit_from_many/5. When the relationship's own filter or sort references parent(...), limit_from_many/5 takes a branch that drops both the limit and the predicate, emitting a bare correlated EXISTS with no predicate. The check then matches any record that has any related row. Most severely, when the expression backs a policy (for example authorize_if expr(exists(memberships, user_id == ^actor(:id)))), the actor-scoping condition disappears and the policy passes for any actor with any related row. This issue affects ash_sql: from 0.4.1 before 0.7.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75757 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Admin | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode. AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81643 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Graphql | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_graphql delivers GraphQL subscription payloads for records a subscriber is not authorized to see. In AshGraphql.Subscription.Batcher, do_send/5 resolves the first notification of a batch and filters it with should_send?/1, which drops results whose errors are coded forbidden or not_found or carry no code, precisely so that unauthorized results are not disclosed. The remaining notifications in the batch are read from the process dictionary, re-run through the pipeline, and appended to the outgoing results without that filter. They reach pubsub.publish_subscription/2, and the not is_nil(record) guard drops only nil records, not error-carrying results. Any two qualifying notifications arriving within the default one-second batch interval suffice, and batching is the default path. The fix applies should_send?/1 to the whole batch. This issue affects ash_graphql: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82724 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Phoenix | 2026-08-31 | N/A |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix invokes the SubdomainHook authorization callback with a nil tenant, so tenant-scoped access checks never see the tenant they are meant to enforce. AshPhoenix.LiveView.SubdomainHook.on_mount/4 attached a handle_params hook to assign the tenant and then immediately called handle_subdomain in the same on_mount. The tenant assign is only written when LiveView later runs handle_params, strictly after on_mount returns, so handle_subdomain read an unset assign and ran as apply(m, f, [socket, nil | a]). A consumer gate that halts when the user does not belong to the tenant instead evaluated nil, either crashing or taking a permissive branch, and it was never re-run once the real subdomain was assigned or on later navigations. The fix runs handle_subdomain inside the handle_params hook with the real tenant on every navigation. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69659 | 2 Ash-hq, Ash-project | 2 Ash Framework, Ash | 2026-08-18 | 5.5 Medium |
| Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of the node via a crafted keyset pagination cursor. Read actions with keyset pagination deserialize the client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex, which base64-decodes the value and passes it to :erlang.binary_to_term/2 without bounding its size. The Erlang external term format supports zlib-compressed payloads, which the decoder inflates transparently, so a cursor of a few kilobytes can allocate tens of megabytes of heap in a single call. Ash itself only ever encodes cursors uncompressed, so the decoder accepts a term shape its encoder never produces. Concurrent requests aggregate these allocations and can terminate the node. This issue affects ash: from 1.17.0 before 3.31.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-67579 | 2 Ash-hq, Ash-project | 2 Ash Framework, Ash | 2026-08-18 | 7.4 High |
| Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject a filter expression through a forged keyset pagination cursor, resulting in SQL injection or code execution depending on the data layer. Read actions with keyset pagination decode the client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex using non_executable_binary_to_term/2 with [:safe]. That guard blocks new atoms, funs, and ports, but not a struct built from atoms already interned in a running Ash application, so a decoded %Ash.Query.Call{} expression survives and is spliced into the keyset filter as a comparison value in do_filters/4 and evaluated. Because the cursor bypasses the Ash.Expr macro, the runtime never applies the private?/public? gate that would otherwise reject it. On AshPostgres the injected fragment is inlined into the SQL query; on the ETS and Simple data layers it is evaluated in-process as an arbitrary function call. This issue affects ash: from 1.17.0 before 3.31.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70395 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to forge a relationship to a record they cannot name, and to recover the secret value used to look it up. When manage_relationship is used with on_lookup: :relate on a belongs_to relationship, the client-supplied lookup value is passed to Ash.Query.filter/2 without being cast to the attribute type. A nested map submitted where a scalar is expected is therefore interpreted as a filter predicate rather than a literal, so a lookup for a specific record becomes a query for any record matching a condition. The same path omits Ash.Query.limit(1), leaving Ash.read_one/2 able to distinguish no match from one match from several, which turns comparison predicates into an oracle for the lookup value. Authorization is unaffected; the destination read policy still applies. This issue affects ash: from 1.52.0-rc.11 before 3.31.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55736 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash | 2026-07-09 | N/A |
| Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34593 | 2 Ash-hq, Ash-project | 2 Ash Framework, Ash | 2026-04-14 | 7.5 High |
| Ash Framework is a declarative, extensible framework for building Elixir applications. Prior to version 3.22.0, Ash.Type.Module.cast_input/2 unconditionally creates a new Erlang atom via Module.concat([value]) for any user-supplied binary string that starts with "Elixir.", before verifying whether the referenced module exists. Because Erlang atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a hard default limit of approximately 1,048,576 entries, an attacker who can submit values to any resource attribute or argument of type :module can exhaust this table and crash the entire BEAM VM, taking down the application. This issue has been patched in version 3.22.0. | ||||