1. The events/pushProposals endpoint located the target event by UUID without enforcing any access-control check. A sync user with perm_sync could push shadow-attribute proposals to any event on the local instance, including events with restricted distribution (e.g., distribution level 0, visible only to the owning organisation). The stored proposal also carried the sender-supplied event_uuid and event_org_id rather than the local event's actual identity, corrupting the data model.
2. When accepting an edit proposal (old_id != 0), the code resolved the target live attribute by UUID alone (Attribute.uuid = shadow.uuid) without scoping the lookup to the proposal's own event. A malicious sync user could therefore craft a proposal whose uuid matched an attribute in a different event; upon acceptance, the wrong attribute would be modified or deleted. The same unscoped lookup existed in the ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal path.
Preconditions: an authenticated user with sync permission (perm_sync) on a MISP instance that participates in server-to-server synchronisation. The attacker must know or enumerate the UUID of a target event or attribute.
Security impact: unauthorised read access to restricted events, unauthorised insertion of proposals onto events the user cannot see, and unauthorised modification or deletion of attributes belonging to other events. This compromises the confidentiality and integrity of threat-intelligence data across organisational boundaries within a MISP deployment.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Vendor Solution
The fix enforces proper authorization scoping at two levels. First, pushProposals now resolves the event through fetchSimpleEvent (which applies ACL) and the pull path uses a new __eventSyncedWithServer helper that verifies the event is actually shared with the syncing server before accepting proposals. The stored event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id are taken from the local event record, not from sender-supplied fields. Second, a new findTargetAttribute method requires all three of Attribute.id, Attribute.event_id, and Attribute.uuid to match simultaneously, ensuring an edit proposal can only affect an attribute within its own event. Acceptance paths now reject the proposal if the target attribute cannot be resolved within the correct event scope.
Tracking
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| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444 |
|
Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | MISP contains an authorization bypass in its server-to-server proposal synchronization mechanism. Two related flaws were identified: 1. The events/pushProposals endpoint located the target event by UUID without enforcing any access-control check. A sync user with perm_sync could push shadow-attribute proposals to any event on the local instance, including events with restricted distribution (e.g., distribution level 0, visible only to the owning organisation). The stored proposal also carried the sender-supplied event_uuid and event_org_id rather than the local event's actual identity, corrupting the data model. 2. When accepting an edit proposal (old_id != 0), the code resolved the target live attribute by UUID alone (Attribute.uuid = shadow.uuid) without scoping the lookup to the proposal's own event. A malicious sync user could therefore craft a proposal whose uuid matched an attribute in a different event; upon acceptance, the wrong attribute would be modified or deleted. The same unscoped lookup existed in the ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal path. Preconditions: an authenticated user with sync permission (perm_sync) on a MISP instance that participates in server-to-server synchronisation. The attacker must know or enumerate the UUID of a target event or attribute. Security impact: unauthorised read access to restricted events, unauthorised insertion of proposals onto events the user cannot see, and unauthorised modification or deletion of attributes belonging to other events. This compromises the confidentiality and integrity of threat-intelligence data across organisational boundaries within a MISP deployment. | |
| Title | MISP Missing Authorization in Sync Proposal Endpoints Allows Cross-Event Data Access and Modification | |
| First Time appeared |
Misp
Misp misp |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 CWE-862 |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Misp
Misp misp |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CIRCL
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-19T14:48:59.217Z
Reserved: 2026-11-19T14:06:35.301Z
Link: CVE-2026-133175
No data.
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-11-19T15:17:37.727
Modified: 2026-11-19T15:17:37.847
Link: CVE-2026-133175
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.