- Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely.
- Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation.
- Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password.
- Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.
An attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account.
Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Vendor Solution
The fix binds browser session identifiers to the account's current credentials using an HMAC-SHA256 token derived from the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash. All login paths (local, SSO, remembered) now rotate the server-side session ID. Self-service email and password changes require the current password. A self-service password change refreshes the owner's session while revoking all other browser sessions and remembered logins. Administrator password resets additionally rotate the user's API key. Legacy bare-ID session identifiers are rejected by the user loader, and session housekeeping code is updated to parse the new format safely.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Fri, 20 Nov 2026 10:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Flowintel , contained a session management vulnerability in its browser authentication mechanism. The session identifier used a bare numeric user ID rather than a credential-bound token, resulting in several related weaknesses: - Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely. - Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation. - Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password. - Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key. An attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account. Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0. | |
| Title | Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Persistent Access After Password Change | |
| First Time appeared |
Flowintel
Flowintel flowintel |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 CWE-384 CWE-613 |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Flowintel
Flowintel flowintel |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CIRCL
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-20T10:24:38.906Z
Reserved: 2026-11-20T10:24:36.475Z
Link: CVE-2026-133652
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-20T11:18:33.510
Modified: 2026-11-20T11:18:33.510
Link: CVE-2026-133652
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.